

Silvio Funtowicz, Centre for the Study of  
the Sciences and the Humanities,  
University of Bergen,

Prodromes of post-normal science,  
August 27th-September 1st, 2018,  
Course Numbers for policy, Castelldefels  
(Barcelona)

Marie Jean Antoine de Condorcet 1795:  
**“Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human  
Mind”**

“Will increased welfare and improved health of man lead to largely increased populations? Will not necessarily there be a time when the number of people has outgrown the natural resources that nature can supply? Is it not reasonable to assume that when resources become scarce, then there will be fight for the resources, war between people?

Nobody could claim that such a time is imminent,  
**Technological progress may bring the answers.**

**People’s ethics and morality will progress alongside reason.** Our moral duty is not to make sure that unborn life is born, but that those that are born are secured a life in reasonable welfare, dignity and happiness.”

# Galileo: primary and secondary qualities



... a piece of paper or a feather, when gently rubbed over any part of our body whatsoever, will in itself act everywhere in an identical way; it will, namely,

. But we, should we be touched between the eyes, on the tip of the nose, or under the nostrils, will feel an almost intolerable titillation – while if touched in other places, we will scarcely feel anything at all. Now this titillation is completely ours and not the feather's, so that if the living, sensing body were removed, nothing would remain of the titillation but an empty name. And I believe that many other qualities, such as taste, odour, colour, and so on, often predicated of natural bodies, have a similar and no greater existence than this.

Galileo Galilei (1623): *The Assayer*



## Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation January 17, 1961

<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5407.htm>

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present – and is gravely to be regarded. **Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.**

Weinberg A M. Science and trans-science. *Minerva* 10:209-22, 1972.  
[Oak Ridge National Laboratory, TN]

## Origins of Science and Trans-Science

Alvin M. Weinberg  
Medical Sciences Division  
Oak Ridge Associated Universities  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117

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becoming involved in the debate over nuclear power—in particular the debate over the hazard of low levels of radiation.

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SUCH BROOKS suggested that an analysis of such situations was beyond the power of mathematics, and therefore, was trans-scientific.<sup>2</sup>

The term "trans-science" is used quite widely now. Perhaps most notable was W. Ruckelhaus's admission in 1985 that many of the EPA's regulations hang on the answers to questions that can be asked of science but cannot be answered by science—i.e., are trans-scientific.<sup>3</sup>

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is gradually being recognized in many  
quarters. For example, W.G. Wagner con-  
cludes: "...in order to accommodate trans-  
science, the judicial framework must  
change... Trans-scientific obstacles can be  
circumvented by referring to more gen-  
eral notions of qualitative causation  
and unreasonable conduct...then the  
courts may be able to reincorporate the  
principle of deterrence into the adjudica-  
tion of toxic torts."<sup>4</sup>

In addition to giving a name to an idea  
that regulators and toxic torts lawyers had  
been grappling with, "science and trans-  
science" has added another dimension to  
the governmental quest for limits to science. To  
the limits of science posed by Weinberg's  
uncertainty principle, or the second law of

the hazard of low levels of radiation. The  
public's exaggerated estimate of risk was  
at the root of the difficulties nuclear en-  
ergy was facing. If ever there was a trans-  
science question, this was it.

After the paper was published, Harvey Brooks added another dimension to "trans-science"—the evolution in time of systems governed by large classes of nonlinear equations. *Harvard* was one of the first to stress

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mits of science. *Proceedings of the Symposium on Phenotypic  
ssment*, December 7-10, 1986. Brookhaven National Laboratory.

*Minerva* 10:484-6, 1972.

*Technol.* 1:19-38, 1985.

4. Wagner W G. Trans-science and torts. *Yale Law J.* 9:428-49, 1986.

## Hazy reasoning behind clean air

Science alone can't determine how regulations are written, argues **David Goldston**.

Last month, *The Washington Post* reported that President George W. Bush had personally intervened to weaken new regulations to control smog just as they were about to be announced by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In response, advocates of tighter standards predictably charged that the president had overturned a scientific judgement. Carol Browner, who headed the EPA under President Bill Clinton, put the matter starkly, telling the *Post* that the Clean Air Act creates "a moral and ethical commitment that we're going to let the science tell us what to do".

But does it? This conceit that science alone should and can dictate clean-air standards is propagated by political figures of all stripes and often by scientists themselves. Politicians always want to argue that any regulatory measure they are supporting is based on science because it sounds objective and fair. That's especially true in a polarized environment, when your side may be the only one that can reach someone with ideological persuasion.

In reality, though, policy judgments involve scientific determinations that are often uncertain. The Clear Air Act's "judicial" decisions to the "judge" of the EPA (a process advised by, among others, the Contending that science conflates policy and muddy the debate needlessly in the line.

So what's really at stake? The rules set what is known as the maximum allowable concentration of ozone, the main component of smog, to "protect the public from damage to crops, not anything else other than what is covered by the primary standard."

The EPA's 24-month review of the secondary standard should ozone be measured as a percentage of the permissible level of ozone may sound like a technical



### PARTY OF ONE

areas turn out to violate the standard because ozone levels can vary significantly within a given day. For example, if being above the allowable

unanimously recommended a specific range of ozone standards, a number within that range can hardly be seen as the only justifiable standard under the law. Indeed, the EPA's own science staff had recommended a slightly different range. Critics are free to attack the number chosen by the president, which will keep some rural counties in compliance with clean-air rules. What they cannot legitimately argue is that the president's selection runs counter to the science. The debate is about what kinds of damage harm the public welfare and what kinds of uncertainty can be tolerated as a basis for decision-making.

The debate over the new ozone standards is just beginning, but the detrimental impact of confusing science with policy can be seen by looking back at what happened in 1997, when the EPA last changed the ozone rules. The fight then was over the primary ozone standard, the one designed to protect public health. The EPA proposed tightening the standard, and Browner (then EPA's chief) repeatedly argued that the decision was dictated by the science.

As a congressional staffer, I fought for the EPA proposal and I still support it. But what the science was that for a given predictable number of violations from aggravated (the time, there was little chronic health reform the policy issue admissions are accepted, a politician was inter-debate. The members of the panel at the time standard to suggest, but was a "policy call", not science in no way told do.

ost in what became a acrimonious debate opponents of the new is was bad for policy flow to decide on an action never got raised,

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even more clearly than of a policy debate debate. In such instances, ripping off the policy-ing them. ■ ing lecturer at ter for the at il.com.

[...] EPA's science panel found that "quantitative evidence [...] must ... be characterized as having high uncertainties." What to do in the face of uncertainty is a policy question, not a scientific question. [...] The debate is about [...] what kinds of uncertainty can be tolerated as a basis for decision-making.



*Industry groups are fighting government regulation by fomenting scientific uncertainty*

# DOUBT

By David Michaels  
Photographs by Mindy Jones

## Is Their Product

Science American, June 2005, pp. 96



RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT  
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992

Principle 15

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, **lack of full scientific certainty** shall **not be used** as a reason for postponing **cost-effective** measures to prevent environmental degradation.



# **The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments**

Richard Rudner

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1953), pp. 1-6

**...clearly the scientist as scientist does make value judgments. For, since no scientific hypothesis is ever completely verified, in accepting a hypothesis the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis. Obviously our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how strong is "strong enough", is going to be a function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis.**

Palmisano, Sam (2010), Welcome to the decade of smart, Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, London, January 12<sup>th</sup> 2010,  
[http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/palmisano\\_decadeofsmart-jan12.pdf](http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/palmisano_decadeofsmart-jan12.pdf)



Let me leave you with one final observation, culled from our learning over the past year. It is this: Building a smarter planet is realistic precisely because **it is so refreshingly non-ideological.**

# Trade treaties centre on science

*Proposed deals have potential to boost research, but also to weaken health and environmental protections.*

BY DANIEL CR ESSEY

401-402 | NATURE | VOL 521 | 28 MAY 2015

## **NATURE | EDITORIAL**

The use of sound science to set regulations that affect trade is to be encouraged. But the science is not always unequivocal, and it must by no means be the only consideration. The practices of individual nations are forged from their own history and culture, resulting in different approaches to how they structure health care, agriculture, food or environmental systems — and in how these are shaped by government and the market, and to what extent. National attitudes to science and technology are formed in a similar way; for example, in the level of risk people are willing to accept, or the ethical limits that such attitudes place on research or medical practices.

*Nature* **521**, 393 (28 May 2015)