

Course: Numbers for policy: Practical problems in quantification: the context

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NEVER PARIBUS

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... and these are 6 m worth watching from Slavoj
Žižek [youtube.com/watch?v=TVwKjG...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVwKjG...)

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Jul 26, 2019



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
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How about women?

1911



1927



Lise Meitner

The first person to understand
nuclear fission;

She did not win the Nobel
prize 1944 for chemistry
which went to her colleague
Otto Hahn



Lise Meitner
1878– 1968

Rosalind Elsie Franklin

Her X-ray images led to the discovery of the DNA double helix structure;

Nobel in Medicine 1962 to J. Watson, F. Crick and M. Wilkins;

Franklin should have ideally been awarded a Nobel Prize in Chemistry (according to J. Watson)



Rosalind Elsie
Franklin
1920–1958

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CLIMATE HOME NEWS

Eunice Foote
(1819–1888)

Meet the woman who first identified the greenhouse effect

Published on 02/09/2016, 5:58pm

Eunice Foote demonstrated the heat-trapping properties of carbon dioxide at a scientific conference in 1856, newly digitised records show

By **Megan Darby**

Irish physicist John Tyndall is commonly credited with discovering the greenhouse effect, which underpins the science of climate change.

ART. XXXI.—*Circumstances affecting the Heat of the*
by EUNICE FOOTE.

(Read before the American Association, August 23d, 1868.)

My investigations have had for their object to determine the effect of different circumstances that affect the thermal action of light that proceed from the sun.

Several results have been obtained.

First. The action increases with the density of the medium, and is diminished as it becomes more rarified.

The experiments were made with an air-pump and glass receivers of the same size, about four inches in diameter and thirty in length. In each were placed two thermometers, and the air was exhausted from one and condensed in the other. After both had acquired the same temperature they were placed in the sun, side by side, and while the action of the sun's rays rose to 110° in the condensed tube, it attained only 85° in the other. I had no means at hand of measuring the density of the air, or its condensation or rarefaction.

The observations taken once in two or three minutes are as follows:

Exhausted Tube		Condensed Tube	
In shade.	In sun.	In shade.	In sun.
73	80	75	80
76	82	78	82
80	82	80	82
83	85	82	85
84	85	85	85

This circumstance must affect the power of the sun's rays in different places, and contribute to produce their effect on the summits of lofty mountains.

Secondly. The action of the sun's rays was found to be more powerful in moist than in dry air.

In one of the receivers the air was saturated with water vapor, in the other it was dried by the use of chlorid of calcium.

Both were placed in the sun as before and the results were as follows:

Dry Air.		Damp Air.	
In shade.	In sun.	In shade.	In sun.
75	75	75	75
78	88	78	88
82	102	82	102
82	104	82	104
82	105	82	105
85	105	92	105


CIRCUMSTANCES

Affecting the Heat of the Sun's Rays.

BY MRS. EUNICE FOOTE.

Frames

“There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity”, be.”



Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay.

Frames

Most analyses offered as input to policy are framed as cost benefit analysis or risk analyses.


8

ON NOT HITTING
THE TAR-BABY

Winner, L., 1986. *The Whale and the Reactor: a Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology*. The University of Chicago Press, 1989 edition.



Langdon Winner



PHISHING FOR PHOOLS


The ECONOMICS of
MANIPULATION & DECEPTION



GEORGE A. AKERLOF
and
ROBERT J. SHILLER

2016

For Akerlof and Shiller – against what the ‘invisible hand’ would contend – economic actors have no choice but to exploit frames to ‘phish’ people into practices which benefit the actors not the subject phished.



George Akerlof



Robert R. Shiller


Frames: The expression ‘tax relief’ is apparently innocuous but it suggests that tax is a burden, as opposed to what pays for road, hospitals, education and other infrastructures of modern life (Lakoff, 2004)

Lakoff, G., 2010, Why it Matters How We Frame the Environment, *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, 4:1, 70–81.

Lakoff, G., 2004–2014, Don’t think of an elephant: know your values and frame the debate, Chelsea Green Publishing.



George Lakoff



Frames as hypocognition &
Socially constructed
ignorance

For Rayner (2012) “Sense-making is possible only through processes of exclusion. Storytelling is possible only because of the mass of detail that we leave out. Knowledge is possible only through the systematic ‘social construction of ignorance’ (Ravetz, 1986)”



Steve Rayner



Jerry Ravetz

Ravetz, J., R., 1987, Usable Knowledge, Usable Ignorance, Incomplete Science with Policy Implications, *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization*, 9(1), 87–116. **Rayner, S., 2012**, Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in science and environmental policy discourses, *Economy and Society*, 41:1, 107–125.

Rayner's (2012) strategies to deal with
“uncomfortable knowledge”.

1. Denial: “There isn't a problem”
2. Dismissal: “It's a minor problem”

Rayner, S., 2012, Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in science and environmental policy discourses, *Economy and Society*, 41:1, 107–125.

Rayner's (2012) strategies to deal with
“uncomfortable knowledge”.

3. Diversion: “Yes I am working on it” (In fact I am working on something that is only apparently related to the problem)


Rayner, S., 2012, Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in science and environmental policy discourses, *Economy and Society*, 41:1, 107–125.

Rayner's (2012) strategies to deal with
“uncomfortable knowledge”.

4. Displacement: “Yes and the model we have developed tells us that real progress is being achieved” (The focus is now the model, not the problem).

Rayner, S., 2012, Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in science and environmental policy discourses, *Economy and Society*, 41:1, 107–125.

“Uncomfortable knowledge” can be used as a gauge of an institution’s health. The larger the “uncomfortable knowledge” an institution needs to keep mum about, the closer it is to its ancient régime stage



Use of frames in the social disputes about technology: the case of genetically modified organisms



Frame: Resistance to GMO is irrational because GMO are safe for consumption



GMO opponents as 'New Age' weirdos

The Economist, Vermont v science, The little state that could kneecap the biotech industry, May 10th 2014

Why are people (and some EU countries) so much against 'Frankenfood': the PABE study

Marris, C., Wynne, B., Simmons P., and Weldon, S. 2001. Final Report of the **PABE** research project funded by the Commission of European Communities, Contract number: FAIR CT98-3844 (DG12 - SSMI), December 2001.



Source: <https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/in-defense-of-franken-foods>

Myth 1: The primordial cause of the problem is that lay people are ignorant about scientific facts

Myth 2: People are either 'for' or 'against' GMOs

Myth 3: Consumers accept medical GMOs but refuse GMOs used in food and agriculture

Myth 4: European consumers are behaving selfishly towards the poor in the Third World

Myth 5: Consumers want labelling in order to exercise their freedom of choice



Myth 6: The public thinks – wrongly – that GMOs are unnatural

Myth 7: It's the fault of the BSE crisis: since then, citizens no longer trust regulatory institutions

Myth 8: The public demands 'zero risk'– and this is not reasonable

Myth 9: Public opposition to GMOs is due to "other – ethical or political– factors“

Myth 10: The public is a malleable victim of distorting sensationalist media



What were instead the
citizens' concerns?



Why do we need GMOs? What are the benefits?

Who will benefit from their use?

Who decided that they should be developed and how?



Why were we not better informed about their use in our food, before their arrival on the market?

Why are we not given an effective choice about whether or not to buy and consume these products?

Do regulatory authorities have sufficient powers and resources to effectively counter-balance large companies who wish to develop these products?



Can controls imposed by regulatory authorities be applied effectively?

Have the risks been seriously assessed? By whom? How?

Have potential long-term consequences been assessed? How?



How have irreducible uncertainties and unavoidable domains of ignorance been taken into account in decision-making?

What plans exist for remedial action if and when unforeseen harmful impacts occur?

Who will be responsible in case of unforeseen harm? How will they be held to account?




US National Academy of Sciences report on genetically engineered crops:
“Products of new technologies should be regulated not only on the basis of their benefit–risk profiles, but also on their societal context and need”



Hunter, J., Duff, G., GM crops—lessons from medicine, *Science*, 353, 1187 (2016)


Why frames ‘stick’

“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.”



Upton Sinclair

Evidence based policy



Source: <https://fcw.com/articles/2018/10/18/evidence-based-omb-gunter.aspx>

From evidence based medicine to evidence based policy; the Cochrane collaboration (1993)

For a systematic reviews of all relevant randomised controlled trials in the field of healthcare
➔ health economics

Evidence-based
policy: often cost
benefit analysis

Cass Sunstein,
winner of the 2018
Holberg Prize



“In a series of books (The Cost Benefit State, 2002, Risk and Reason, 2002, and The Laws of Fear, 2004), Sunstein shows the ways in which cost benefit analysis can discipline regulatory agencies”

<https://www.holbergprisen.no/en/holberg-prize/prize-winners/cass-r-sunstein>

Can technocracy be saved? An interview with Cass Sunstein.

Obama's regulation czar makes the case that "the issues that most divide us are fundamentally about facts rather than values."

By Dylan Matthews | @dylanmatt | dylan@vox.com | Oct 22, 2018, 9:00am EDT

<https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/18001014/cass-sunstein-cost-benefit-analysis-technocracy-liberalism>



“Often, immersion
in the facts makes
value disagreements
feel much less
relevant”
(C. Sunstein)



<https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/18001014/cass-sunstein-cost-benefit-analysis-technocracy-liberalism>

The Sameness of Cass Sunstein

His books keep pushing the same technocratic fixes. But today's most pressing questions cannot be depoliticized.

By **AARON TIMMS** | June 20, 2019

A critique of Sunstein's faith in 'nudge' and cost benefit analysis



<https://newrepublic.com/article/154236/sameness-cass-sunstein>

The price of everything: what people get wrong about cost-benefit analysis

Far from leading to better results, cost-benefit analysis too often provides a bogus rationale for bad decisions

by John Kay / March 8, 2019 / [Leave a comment](#)




John Kay




<https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-price-of-everything-what-people-get-wrong-about-cost-benefit-analysis>

One of the winner of Nobel prize for economics 2018 is **Willem Nordhaus**, for his work on the economics of climate change.

Cost benefit analysis to the year 2100?



Are these licit quantifications?



Saltelli, A., Stark, P.B., Becker, W., and Stano, P. , 2015, Climate Models as Economic Guides. Scientific Challenge or Quixotic Quest? Issues in Science and Technology (IST), Volume XXXI Issue 3, Spring 2015, <https://issues.org/climate-models-as-economic-guides-scientific-challenge-or-quixotic-quest/>

How do we appraise the work of experts when this feeds into policy? A complex matter for Clark and Majone



W. C. Clark and G. Majone, "The Critical Appraisal of Scientific Inquiries with Policy Implications," *Sci. Technol. Hum. Values*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 6–19, Jul. 1985.

Clark and Majone → The appraisals of quality in evidence based policy is a complex affair:

- Different parties have a legitimate say;
- There are multiple criteria of value, quality, effectiveness and legitimacy

**The Critical Appraisal of Scientific
Inquiries with Policy Implications**

p. [6]


William C. Clark and Giandomenico Majone

The Critical Appraisal of Scientific Inquiries with Policy Implications

p. [6]

William C. Clark and Giandomenico Majone

➔ Abandon hopes of simplicity, of “speaking truth to power”



Evidence based
policy versus policy
based evidence

PETRUCHIO: I say it is the moon.

KATHERINE: I know it is the moon.

PETRUCHIO: Nay, then you lie. It is
the blessèd sun.

KATHERINE: Then God be blessed, it is
the blessèd sun.

But sun it is not, when you say it is not,
And the moon changes even as your mind



W. Shakespeare,
the Taming of
the Shrew,
Act IV

‘Policy based evidence’ has entered the public discourse, and warring parties accuse one another of the sin. Example:


“[...] what Greenpeace wants is policy-based evidence making not evidence-based policy making” (Sanderson, 2015) ...


Wilkes, G., 2015, Free Lunch: Policy-based evidence-making, Financial Times, July 3.

Sanderson, A.B., 3 Feb 2015, **Breitbart**, see

<http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/02/03/academic-attacks-greenpeace-for-ignoring-the-evidence-on-gm-crops/>; the politician is UKIP Energy Spokesman Roger Helmer MEP.

Collingridge and Reeve (1986)





Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in Policymaking

Hardcover – 31 Dec 1986

by [David Collingridge](#) (Author), [Colin Reeve](#) (Author)

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
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1 New from £999.11




... you find a copy
on my web site

Collingridge and Reeve advocate as model for policy decision one of least dependence on science; why?




The twin myths of rationality

1. policy action is predicated on the accumulation of facts and the taming of uncertainty and
2. the power of science (whereby science is there to provide dispassionate facts to adjudicate controversies)





Giandomenico Majone



(1992)

EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, &
PERSUASION IN
THE POLICY
PROCESS
GIANDOMENICO
MAJONE

The pretended distinction between facts and value is used instrumentally

In the policy process often facts and values cannot be separated in the making of an argument

EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, &
PERSUASION IN
THE POLICY
PROCESS
GIANDOMENICO
MAJONE

“When science, technology, and public policy intersect, different attitudes, perspectives, and rules of argument come into sharp conflict. Scientific criteria of truth clash with legal standards of evidence and with political notions of what constitutes sufficient ground for action”

EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, &
PERSUASION IN
THE POLICY
PROCESS
GIANDOMENICO
MAJONE

“the technique is never neutral”

<https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1712/1712.06457.pdf>

Majone: “In any area of public policy the choice of instruments, far from being a technical exercise that can be safely delegated to the experts, reflects as in a microcosm all the political, moral, and cultural dimensions of policy-making”

EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, &
PERSUASION IN
THE POLICY
PROCESS


GIANDOMENICO

MAJONE

“[my suggestion is to view a] policy analyst as a producer of arguments, capable of distinguishing between good and bad rhetoric, rather than as a “number cruncher” ...



Ulrich Beck
(1944 –2015)




1992 (1986)

Chapter 7 Science beyond truth and enlightenment

1. Feudalization of cognitive practices


“In developed civilizations, scientific cognitive practice becomes an *implicit, objectivized manipulation of latently political variables, hidden behind the pretence of elective decision not subject to justification.*” → On transforming a political problem into a technical one



Chapter 7 Science beyond truth and enlightenment

Feudalization of cognitive practices


2. “The target groups of science in administration, politics, business and the public sphere become *coproducers* of socially valid knowledge – in conflictual and collaboration and opposition.”



Chapter 7 Science beyond truth and enlightenment

3. “The differentiation and complexification of the sciences transforms it into a “self service shops for financially well endowed customers in need of arguments.”


4. “It is not uncommon for political programs to be decided in advance simply by the choice of what expert representatives are included in the circle of advisers.” → The technique is never neutral




Chapter 8 Opening up the political


1. “Modernity has even taken up the role of its counterpart the tradition to be overcome, the natural constraint to be mastered. It has become the threat and the promise of emancipation from the threat that it creates itself.”

2. “Progress replaces voting”; The necessity, the non-decidability of technological ‘progress’ becomes the bolt securing the process to its democratic (non)legitimation. → Critique of Cartesian Dream





Elijah Millgram: Describes the dream of a “procedural utopia”, a machinery to take the right decision based on a set of logical rules and methods, a Cartesian dream



Cartesian dream?

This dream started with
Condorcet's *Mathématique
sociale*; Bentham's utilitarianism;



Jeremy Bentham
1748–832



Nicolas de Caritat,
marquis de Condorcet
1743–1794

Today's 'decisionism' (considered as a fallacy by G. Majone) – the idea that decisions can always systematically arrived at given a modicum of computation

<<‘tools’ like ‘externality assessment’, ‘impact analysis’ or ‘quantitative valuation’ help convince others which energy policy or health and safety standards or conservation strategy might be considered to be objectively ‘safest’, ‘safe enough’, ‘tolerable’ or even ‘best’>>



Andrew Stirling

<https://steps-centre.org/blog/how-politics-closes-down-uncertainty/>

<<[...] rhetoric clamour [surrounds]
'expected utility', 'decision theory',
'life cycle assessment', 'ecosystem
services' 'sound scientific decisions'
and 'evidence-based policy'



Andrew Stirling

Each technique routinely delivers its
answers with formidable levels of
precision. Yet the resulting impression
of accuracy is deeply misplaced >>



Futures

Volume 91, August 2017, Pages 62–71



Original research article

What is wrong with evidence based policy, and how can it be improved?

Andrea Saltelli^{a, b, c}  , Mario Giampietro^{a, c, d}

Highlights

- There is a crisis of science's governance forcing to reconsider evidence based policy as it is being practiced at present.
- The closure of any issue in a pre-established frame used for quantification may correspond to normative and political stances.

- The use of mathematical modelling and indicators conveys a spurious impression of precision, prediction and control.
- Better styles of evidence based policy should flag the existence of 'uncomfortable knowledge' usually avoided in policy discussions.
- We suggest a strategy – Quantitative storytelling – to opening the space of possible narratives and control their quality .

Science and lobbying

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Futures xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx



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Futures

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures



Why science's crisis should not become a political battling ground

Andrea Saltelli

Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities – University of Bergen, Norway; Open Evidence Research, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Barcelona, Spain

- Science' reproducibility crisis has become a political and industrial battleground.
- Conservatives and corporate interests use the crisis to weaken regulations, their opponent deny the existence of even a reproducibility crisis.
- This right-left divide in the reading of the science's present predicaments is unhelpful and dangerous to the survival of science itself.

- An alternative reading of the crisis would suggest that structural contradictions have emerged in modern science.

- Addressing these contradictions should be the focus of our attention.

Power asymmetries in the framing of issues:
those who have the deepest pockets marshal
the best evidence → Instrumental use of
quantification to obfuscate



Why science's crisis should not become a political battling ground

Andrea Saltelli

Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities – University of Bergen, Norway; Open Evidence Research, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Barcelona, Spain

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Special Communication | September 12, 2016

Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research

A Historical Analysis of Internal Industry Documents FREE

ONLINE FIRST

Cristin E. Kearns, DDS, MBA^{1,2}; Laura A. Schmidt, PhD, MSW, MPH^{1,3,4}; Stanton A. Glantz, PhD^{1,5,6,7,8}

[+] Author Affiliations

JAMA Intern Med. Published online September 12, 2016. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.5394


Text Size: A A A

September 12, 2016

See also <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/apr/07/the-sugar-conspiracy-robert-lustig-john-yudkin>, and the story of US President Dwight Eisenhower heart attack,...

“our findings suggest the industry sponsored a research program in the 1960s and 1970s that successfully cast doubt about the hazards of sucrose while promoting fat as the dietary culprit in CHD [coronary hearth disease]”

<http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2548255>



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Special Communication | September 12, 2016

Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research

A Historical Analysis of Internal Industry Documents FREE

ONLINE FIRST

Cristin E. Kearns, DDS, MBA^{1,2}; Laura A. Schmidt, PhD, MSW, MPH^{1,3,4}; Stanton A. Glantz, PhD^{1,5,6,7,8}

[\[+\] Author Affiliations](#)

JAMA Intern Med. Published online September 12, 2016. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.5394

Text Size: A A A

*Industry groups are fighting
government regulation by
fomenting scientific uncertainty*

DOUBT

By David Michaels
Photographs by Mindy Jones

Is Their Product


Scientific American, June 2005,
https://www.phil.vt.edu/dmayo/personal_website/PhilEvRelReg/Doubt%20is%20their%20Product.pdf

DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT

**How Industry's Assault on Science
Threatens Your Health**

David Michaels

2010



2010



Naomi Oreskes



Beware: transparency rule is a Trojan Horse



Like tobacco lobbyists and climate-change deniers, the US Environmental Protection Agency is co-opting scientific trappings to sow doubt, warns Naomi Oreskes.

WORLD VIEW · 22 MAY 2018

“Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general public” (Philip Morris memo, 1969)




PHILIP MORRIS

(US) corporate interest can spend on lobbying
\$34 for each dollar spent by diffuse interest
and unions combined




Lee Drutman



(EU) the Brussels concentration effect



Sylvain Laurens



For both scholars a salient aspect of this power is lobbyists' access to more and better disseminated science

➔ Urgent a remedial action to give citizens and political staffers some structured mechanism of access to independent scientific evidence (L. Drutman)

See discussion on OTA in Adam Keiper, 2004, Science and Congress, The New Atlantis, <https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/science-and-congress>

Penetration of lobbyists in
institutions having to do with
scientific advice

Please cite this paper as:

OECD (2015), "Scientific Advice for Policy Making: The Role and Responsibility of Expert Bodies and Individual Scientists", *OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers*, No. 21, OECD Publishing, Paris.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js3311jcpwb-en>




OECD Science, Technology and Industry
Policy Papers No. 21

Scientific Advice for Policy Making

THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF EXPERT
BODIES AND INDIVIDUAL SCIENTISTS

OECD


2015



2016

Adopted Feb. 2017 at AAAS
symposium, 5y gestation

Hundreds of experts involved



J. McCambridge, M. Daube, and M. McKee,
“Brussels Declaration: a vehicle for the
advancement of tobacco and alcohol
industry interests at the science/policy
interface?” Tob. Control, Jun. 2018.

L. Bero, “Ten tips for spotting industry
involvement in science policy.” Tob.
Control, Jun. 2018.



What do 'they' say?



"HIS MASTER'S VOICE"

REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.

“Regulatory policy is increasingly made with the participation of experts, especially academics. A regulated firm or industry should be prepared whenever possible to co-opt these experts. This is most effectively done by identifying the leading expert in each relevant field and hiring them as consultants or advisors or giving them research grant or the like”

Owen, B. M., & Braeutigam, R., 1978 The regulation game, :
Strategic Use of the Administrative Process, Ballinger
Press

“This activity requires a modicum of finesse; it must not be too blatant, for the experts themselves must not recognize that they have lost their objectivity and freedom of action”

Thanks to Erik Millstone

Owen, B. M., & Braeutigam, R., 1978 The regulation game, : Strategic Use of the Administrative Process, Ballinger Press

US news

Science institute that advised EU and UN 'actually industry lobby group'

International Life Sciences Institute used by corporate backers to counter public health policies, says study

Arthur Neslen

Mon 3 Jun 2019 03.00 BST




1,256



Regulatory capture in the name of enlightenment?

Science and its institutions – especially when operating at the science – policy interface, appear vulnerable to forms of societal penetration and control where lobbyists present themselves as upholders of the values of the Enlightenment against science's (and progress') purported enemies.

“...from the experts and the fundamental controversies they have fought out (or not fought out) one can learn how unwelcome results can be blocked *professionally*...”






COMMENT • 21 MAY 2019

Views from a continent in flux

Nature asked nine leading Europeans to pick their top priority for science at this pivotal point. Love, money, and trust got most votes.

Carlos Moedas, Isabelle Vernos , Stephan Kuster , Helga Nowotny , Andrea Saltelli , Alina Mungiu-Pippidi ,
Jan Wouter Vasbinder , Daniel R. Brooks & Patrick Cunningham 

ANDREA SALTELLI

**Save science
from itself**

All that matters operates
simultaneously in science,
technology, economics, law and
policy ... battles in which science,
ideology and special interests
collide... social media imprint
unprecedented reach and
acceleration

ANDREA SALTELLI
**Save science
from itself**

Science to inform policy decisions
versus science lending a veil of
rationality to the same decisions

Science as a source of emancipation
versus science as the currency of
lobbies

Artificial intelligence & big data foster
inequality and power asymmetries in
platform and surveillance capitalism.

Ethics washing in
evidence based policy

Ethics washing made in Europe

By Thomas Metzinger

On Tuesday, the EU has published ethics guidelines for artificial intelligence. A member of the expert group that drew up the paper says: This is a case of ethical white-washing

“... a compromise of which I am not proud, but which is nevertheless the best in the world on the subject”

<https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/eu-guidelines-ethics-washing-made-in-europe/24195496.html>

A commission of 52 members, “with only four ethicists alongside 48 non-ethicists – representatives from politics, universities, civil society, and above all industry”

OK to involve industry from the start to get the sector onboard but “The guidelines are lukewarm, short-sighted and deliberately vague”

“They ignore long-term risks, gloss over difficult problems …with rhetoric, violate elementary principles of rationality and pretend to know things that nobody really knows”

Expression such as “non-negotiable” and “Red Lines” had to be dropped for the sake of a “positive vision”

<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai>



The guidelines touch on hot issues such as

- citizens scoring,
- autonomous lethal weapons,
- covert AI systems,
- tracking of individuals...

<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai>



This amounts to “ethics washing = cultivating ethical debates to buy time, distract the public and to prevent or at least delay effective regulation

… industry is building one “ethics washing machine” after another”


Since China is already embarked in “digital totalitarianism” and little hope of strong regulation from the US, Europe bears the responsibility

The EU guidelines are good by comparison, but

“Because industry acts more quickly and efficiently than politics or the academic sector, there is a risk that, as with “Fake News”, we will now also have a problem with fake ethics”

The innovation principle



English 

[Home](#) > [Research and innovation](#) > [Law and regulations](#) > [Innovation-friendly legislation](#)

Ensuring EU legislation supports innovation

What the Innovation Principle is, how it was developed, links to Innovation Deals as well as the better regulation research and innovation tool.

The innovation principle



Ensuring EU legislation supports innovation

What is the Innovation Principle?

The Innovation Principle is a tool to help achieve EU policy objectives by ensuring that legislation is designed in a way that creates the best possible conditions for innovation to flourish.

The principle means that in future when the Commission develops new initiatives it will take into account the effect on innovation.

This will ensure that all new EU policy or regulations support innovation and that the regulatory framework in Europe is innovation-friendly.

Against the principle of precaution:

“How an industry association wrote a new principle on innovation and succeeded in introducing this [innovation] principle into a number of European Union (EU) texts”

Garnett, Kathleen & Van Calster, Geert & Reins, Leonie. (2018). Towards an innovation principle: an industry trump or shortening the odds on environmental protection?. *Law, Innovation and Technology*. 10. 1-14. 10.1080/17579961.2018.1455023.

“This is the first time an industry association has successfully tried to introduce a new principle into the EU’s legal order”

Garnett, Kathleen & Van Calster, Geert & Reins, Leonie. (2018). Towards an innovation principle: an industry trump or shortening the odds on environmental protection?. *Law, Innovation and Technology*. 10. 1-14. 10.1080/17579961.2018.1455023.

The End



@andreasaltelli