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The technique is never neutral. How methodological choices condition the generation of narratives for sustainability.

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“It is not uncommon for political programs to be decided in advance simply by the choice of what expert representatives are included in the circle of advisers.”
(U. Beck [1])

Abstract

How to tackle uncertainties and ensure quality in integrated assessment for sustainability? To what extent does the choice of the methodology condition the narrative produced by the analysis? The present work argues that the two questions are tightly coupled. The technique is never neutral. If we are the tools of our tools, as suggested by Thoreau, then it can also be said that language is not only a vehicle for communication, it is the driver as well. For this reason, in sustainability assessment it is not unusual to discern a close relationship between arguments made and methods adopted. In the present work a set of six reflexive analytical tools – we call them lenses – is suggested which could be pooled to the effect to appraise and improve the quality of integrated assessment and the resulting sustainability narratives, and to alleviate the constraints of the method-argument dependency. None of the lenses is new and each has been used before. Never have they been used together. The lenses are (i) Post-normal science (PNS), (ii) Controversy studies, (iii) Sensitivity auditing, (iv) Bioeconomics, (v) Ethics of science for governance, and (vi) Non-Ricardian economics. The six lenses are illustrated together with a set of case/narratives/arguments. The lenses allow some narratives – or methodologies – to be shown as either implausible or inadequate, and new narratives to be developed to tackle pressing sustainability issues, which expand the horizon of possible strategies for a solution.

36 Introduction

37 Narratives are a key element of sustainability assessments, even while they are not always
38 explicitly articulated. In turn, worldviews, values and imaginaries shape both individual and
39 societal sustainability narratives, deliberately or unconsciously, particularly when solutions to
40 complex challenges are sought and option spaces scrutinised. For example, the integrated
41 assessments developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offer no
42 scenario exploring the effects of discontinuing economic growth, globally or in the affluent
43 countries, as policy options around sufficiency or degrowth were considered implausible,
44 making continued economic growth for the next 80 years the default choice [2]. Whether one
45 agrees or not on the choice, the example points to the fact that integrated assessments are
46 unlikely to result in ‘*critical objective evaluations*’ contrary to what was suggested by UNEP
47 [3]. In reality, global environmental assessments *face a broad range of divergent political*
48 *stakes, interests and ethical values, as well as different forms of disputed knowledge claims*
49 [4] which must be somehow responded to in order to ensure the essential qualities of
50 integrated assessments: saliency, legitimacy and credibility [5]. In global environmental
51 assessments, the resolution of ‘scientific’ divergent viewpoints and uncertainties cannot be
52 disentangled from political or ethical considerations, given the entanglement between facts
53 and values, therefore integrated approaches are required [4]. The present work combines six
54 different analytical lenses to critically appraise narratives for sustainability. The six lenses are
55 complementary and are pooled to appraise and improve the quality of integrated assessments
56 and the resulting environmental narratives. None of the lenses is new and each has been used
57 before. Never have they been used together. This selection of lenses and proponents may
58 result from a “contingent gathering of personalities dissatisfied with the dominant paradigms
59 of integrated assessment”, as noted by a perceptive reviewer. They can also be thought of as
60 an advocacy coalition, if not yet a school, although the Centre for the Study for Science and
61 the Humanities at the University of Bergen has become a common home where these ideas
62 have currency and are disseminated in books[6][7], projects, articles, symposia and courses¹.
63 Undeniably, because of their history of cooperation, these authors and their closest
64 collaborators can be thought of as an epistemic community. The vision of five of the seven
65 authors of the present work is used in the context of a large EC funded research on the nexus
66 between water, energy and food resources [8] (<https://magic-nexus.eu/>). In the MAGIC

¹ <https://bit.ly/2WLbz0W>, <https://bit.ly/2NJKAyP>, <https://bit.ly/34BNGf7>.

67 project a combination of these lenses is used to check the plausibility of: (i) justification
68 narratives (the *why* of the proposed policy); (ii) normative narrative (the *what* of the proposed
69 policy); and (iii) explanation narratives (the *how* of the proposed policy), where the three
70 categories are taken from [9]. The results of the project show that there is a lot of
71 “uncomfortable knowledge”[10] (unknown knowns) that is ignored in current sustainability
72 discussions. So far, the collaboration across this contingent gathering of personalities has
73 proven fruitful and enlightening for all of those involved. Our hope is that it will function
74 likewise for the reader. Given the geographical collocation of the authors, and their
75 engagement in EU policy-related research, e.g. in MAGIC [8], in the cooperation with the
76 European Environment Agency, and in European science advice fora [11], the text reads as
77 Europe-centred, but the implications for policy are general.

78 The lenses are (i) Post-normal science (PNS), (ii) Controversy studies, (iii) Sensitivity
79 auditing, (iv) Bioeconomics, (v) Ethics of science for governance, and (vi) Non-Ricardian
80 economics. The six lenses are presented using illustrative cases while focusing on the quality
81 of narratives and arguments in integrated assessments for sustainability. The present work
82 addresses two main questions:

- 83 • Is it possible to better tackle uncertainties and ensure quality in integrated assessment
84 for sustainability?
- 85 • Is it possible to better deal with the fact that the choice of the methodology conditions
86 the narratives produced by the analysis?

87 The present work argues that the two questions are coupled, because the technique is never
88 neutral. If we have become the tools of our tools, as suggested by Thoreau, then it can also be
89 said that language is not only a vehicle for communication, it is the driver as well.

90 For this reason, in integrated sustainability assessment a close relationship exists between
91 arguments made and methods adopted. This relationship did not go unnoticed to the fathers
92 of the ecological movement, with their early critique of risk and cost benefit analyses [12].

93 We show how the adoption of the selected lenses can provide an alternative or a critique to
94 existing mainstream visions and imaginaries. It can be argued, for example, that

- 95 - while the EC ‘Circular economy package [13]’ contains valuable elements, a truly
96 circular economy is not around the corner;

- 97 - decarbonizing European and global economies will not be achieved in a couple of
98 decades;
- 99 - evidence-based policy suffers from serious pathologies of power asymmetry which
100 would demand our urgent attention;
- 101 - trade may not be beneficial for those who trade diminishing return goods (e.g. raw
102 materials) as compared to those who trade increasing return goods (e.g. high-end
103 manufacture);
- 104 - pollinators decline - the closest likely ecological catastrophe - is the result of systemic
105 institutional and regulatory failure.

106 These are just examples, and the positions taken in this work are not meant to represent a
107 corpus, containing a unique revealed truth, which is offered as a substitute for existing
108 narratives. Nor are they presented at the exclusion of other valid approaches which might be
109 used to revisit common wisdoms. It will be argued instead that these lenses taken together
110 already allow a considerable and useful broadening of the spectrum of existing discourses on
111 sustainability. This entails, as it should, a critical analysis of some of the existing stories told
112 about development, sustainability, and transitions, with their unspoken assumptions [14], and
113 ethical implications [15]. Confronted with the present debate between techno-pessimists and
114 techno-optimists [16][17], we propose an avenue to tackle transitions endowed with a
115 pragmatic outlook and fungible instruments, while supporting the concept that original
116 imaginaries need to be developed for a democratic and sustainable future of our relation with
117 technology [18]. As discussed below, each lens provides a different check of the quality of
118 narratives.

119 In the following sections we briefly illustrate the six lenses with a test case each. We then
120 discuss what is achieved when these lenses are taken in combination.

121

122 [First lens, post normal science](#)

123 [The lens](#)

124 Post-normal science (PNS) [19] is foremost a set of practical insights in science for policy.
125 PNS assists scientists and stakeholders to work together when facts are uncertain, values are
126 in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent. PNS embraces complexity, and addresses the
127 dangers of reductionism - the idea that every practical problem can be decomposed into a

128 sum of simple technical problems, or against the arbitrary distinction between facts and
129 values, especially at the science-policy interface.

130 PNS also shows the ineffectiveness of a problem-solving strategy that reduces policy
131 questions to technical problems, for example when implausible cost-benefit analyses are
132 employed to monetize the value of environmental goods [20] or when the problem of food
133 scarcity is presented as a technical problem of agricultural management and production
134 volume rather than an issue of unequal distribution of power and resources [21]. PNS can be
135 deployed in a whole range of issues, such as "eradication of exogenous pests [...], offshore
136 oil prospecting, legalization of recreational psychotropic drugs, water quality, family
137 violence, obesity, teenage morbidity and suicide, the ageing population, the prioritization of
138 early childhood education, reduction of agricultural greenhouse gases, and balancing
139 economic growth and environmental sustainability" [22]. A historic theme for PNS is
140 science's quality control and governance system [23][24][25][26].

141 PNS is suited for a broad set of "wicked" [27] policy issues, drawing credibility and
142 legitimacy from its focus in the quality of the problem-solving process and products. Quality
143 in policy-related research must encompass a plurality of perspectives and the recognition of
144 different sorts of uncertainty. In this way, quality replaces truth as the focus of science
145 deployed for the resolution of complex socio-environmental policy decision-making.
146 Quality in PNS is assessed by an extended peer community, constituted by all those with a
147 stake or interest in the relevant issue – such as accredited experts, affected or interested
148 citizens, investigative journalists, or whistle blowers. The extended peer community has an
149 important role in framing the relevant practical issue, and proposing the techno-scientific
150 problems to solve, thus ensuring that a diverse and broad set of perspectives are included, and
151 that no single interest dominates and constraints the problem-solving process.

152 In the context of the present proposal for an integrated set of lenses, PNS provides a
153 commitment to openness, plurality and prudence in meeting the challenges of progress.
154 Foremost, PNS' standpoint is to encourage multiple perspectives and ideational concepts,
155 while at the same time promoting an active appreciation of the corresponding regimes of
156 governance, of the involved actors, and of their interests, capabilities and stakes [28].

157

158

159 The lens in action: Post-normal concerns in a boundary organization - towards
160 reflexive practices in knowledge production and appraisal at the EEA
161 The very concept of evidence, its operational definition and production, use and legitimacy are
162 nowadays more challenged than ever. Trust in public institutions and their narratives is eroding,
163 and the role of experts and expertise in governance is contested [6]. Under these new
164 circumstances, known problems concerning uncertainty, ambiguity and scientific controversies
165 are acquiring a renewed meaning, and relevance in the public debate. There is increased
166 recognition of the emergence of ‘socially contested facts’ in opposition to a regime of ‘socially
167 accepted facts’. Such changes are likely to influence current and future environment within
168 which the European institutions operate.

169 The European Environment Agency (EEA) is a recognized authoritative source of information
170 on environmental matters, which publishes relevant assessments: EEA’s State and Outlook of
171 the European environment (SOER) 2015 had a potential audience of 55 million people in
172 Europe. According to its mission,² “*The EEA aims to support sustainable development and to
173 help achieve significant and measurable improvement in Europe’s environment through the
174 provision of timely, targeted, relevant and reliable information to policy makers and the
175 public.*”

176 Attention to quality issues and uncertainty is not new for the EEA [29] [5] [30], and it has
177 increased as a result of public concerns over the quality of environmental studies [31], which
178 triggered more explicit and systematic treatment of uncertainty in sustainability assessments.
179 Because of the uneven distribution of uncertainty treatment across the EEA knowledge chain
180 (i.e. the Monitoring-Data-Indicator-Assessment-Knowledge framework), and the progressive
181 shift in attention towards solution-orientated, systems and sustainability assessments, quality
182 concerns have increased. For instance, uncertainties of less technical nature, and relevant to
183 world-views, values, and trade-offs have come to the fore which requires to engage more
184 prominently with civil society and multiple stakeholders, broadening the already ample
185 spectrum of the EEA institutional partners.

186 Developing the State and Outlook of the European environment integrated assessment report
187 2020, the EEA has initiated a process to ensure that the structure, and quality of the knowledge
188 base, including multiple sorts of uncertainty, are critically identified and communicated.

² <https://www.eea.europa.eu/about-us>

189 To this goal, the assessment process has been set-up and articulated according to the following
190 steps: stock-taking of practices and approaches in academia and among similar institutions;
191 awareness raising through workshops; and pragmatic application to the SOER context. It has
192 been deployed to foster diffusion of knowledge and stimulate development of attitudes and
193 skills among EEA staff involved in the drafting of the assessment.

194 The main outcome resulted in a guidance document in the form of a checklist for authors, aimed
195 at facilitating assessment and communication of overall robustness of findings in SOER
196 thematic chapters. The approach, tested and refined through interactions among EEA staff
197 members, has been largely inspired by guidance for uncertainty assessment and communication
198 developed in the Netherlands [32][33][34][35][36], one of the first applications of PNS as a
199 reflexive tool for knowledge quality assessment in public institutions [31].

200

201 Overall, the thematic authors were guided toward the identification of uncertainties pertaining
202 to framing, consistency between knowledge base and the problem, as well as on more technical
203 aspects. To facilitate further interactions and applicability, special emphasis has been put on
204 identifying aspects such as soundness and completeness of the knowledge base, main
205 limitations and degree of expert judgement involved. In order to increase the relevance and
206 visibility of the outcomes, overall reflections on the underpinning knowledge base and its
207 robustness have been included in thematic summary tables, as a complement to environmental
208 trends and prospects.

209 Aspects related to framing and pertinence of the knowledge base have been left to the main
210 text of the assessment, and to the processes of interaction and feedback with institutional
211 stakeholders. The uncertainties characterising systemic, forward-looking and solution-
212 orientated aspects of the assessment, were the most difficult to deal with. Combining diverging
213 perspectives within an overarching narrative has implied choices, simplifications and even
214 exclusions, limiting the ability to fully describe complex, uncertain and ambiguous aspects of
215 sustainability challenges and responses.

216 Overall, while unable to respond to all possible concerns regarding practice in a boundary
217 organization [37] (e.g. epistemic authority and extended peer community) the next edition of
218 the SOER report is expected to reflect an improved understanding of quality and uncertainty
219 issues as well as improved transparency in their communication. Though incremental, this can
220 be regarded as an important advancement. Also, the spill-over effect that EEA's products and

221 approaches have in framing environmental and sustainability challenges in Europe should not
222 be underestimated, also for what concerns countries reporting across the European environment
223 information and observation network (Eionet).

224

225 Second lens, Controversy studies

226 The lens

227 Science and society increasingly face endless controversies on issues such as e.g. the
228 desirability of genetically modified food, the use of geoengineering to fight climate change,
229 or the relative importance of interacting causes in explaining observed patterns of pollinator
230 decline. More and better science on these risks will not necessarily close the controversies
231 [38].

232 Additionally, the phenomenon of scientific dissent and controversy tends to be under-
233 addressed in existing analyses of uncertainty and quality at the science-policy interface,
234 where the prevailing narrative tends to exalt consensus, often used instrumentally to
235 adjudicate a political debate [39].

236 This lens suggests a systematic mapping and analysing of how societal interests and conflicts
237 co-shape the ways in which evidence is produced, communicated and used, how uncertainty
238 is dealt with, how institutionalized styles of reasoning on evidence and regulatory
239 frameworks co-define whose evidence counts and what style of scientific reasoning [40]. In-
240 depth insight is thus obtained in the anatomy of scientific dissent and the surrounding
241 controversies. This can in turn be used to anticipate conflict and manage it proactively,
242 improve uncertainty communication and enhance the quality and transparency of scientific
243 assessments. This lens acknowledges its debt to critical discourse analysis and to the practice
244 of ‘constructive deconstruction’ typical of a PNS style of analysis. In the integrated set of
245 lenses proposed in this work this particular lens takes the phenomenon of scientific
246 controversy as the object of the analysis, as opposed to an accident in the treatment of a
247 controversial case. It tests the quality of existing narratives when scientific dissent, i.e. the
248 co-existence of a plurality of tenable but conflicting scientific interpretations of the same
249 body of evidence, is taken as part of the definition of the problem. As noted by Beck [1]

250 “--- from the experts and the fundamental controversies they have fought out (or not
251 fought out) one can learn how unwelcome results can be blocked professionally (by
252 methodological criticism, for instance).”

253 The lens in action: Chemicals pollution and biodiversity and ecosystem services: the
254 case of neonicotinoid insecticides and entomofauna collapse (insectageddon)
255 This case deals with the parallel increase of honeybee disorders reported in many European
256 countries (e.g. France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Greece) and in
257 American apiaries [41][42] and the global declines in wild pollinators [43], and insects in
258 general [44], which has received considerable mediatic attention [45][46] and is the subject
259 of an intense controversy involving important players in the agrochemical sector. The
260 available evidence correlates overall insect decline to intensive agriculture with systemic
261 neonicotinoid insecticides as the most problematic class of agrochemicals.

262 Neonicotinoids - the globally most widely used and fastest growing class of insecticides, and
263 whose residual we now regularly ingest with food and vegetable [47], are very high on the
264 list of persistent organochlorine pollutants of emerging concern and are considered to be one
265 of the key drivers of this global collapse of insect populations [48][49]. The collapse has a
266 number of repercussions including loss of biodiversity and impairment of ecosystem
267 resilience, also outside of the insect realm, and poses a global risk to insect-mediated
268 ecosystem services such as pollination, soil and freshwater functions (decomposition of
269 organic matter and nutrient cycling), fisheries, biological pest control. Such insect-mediated
270 ecosystem services are essential for ecosystem functioning and global food security.

271 In February 2018 EFSA published its long-awaited new risk assessment
272 (<https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/180228>) and concluded that most uses of
273 neonicotinoid pesticides represent a risk to wild bees and honeybees. These new conclusions
274 update those published in 2013, after which the European Commission imposed controls on
275 use of the substances. For the new assessments, which this time cover wild bees –
276 bumblebees and solitary bees – as well as honeybees, EFSA’s Pesticides Unit carried out an
277 extensive data collection exercise, including a systematic literature review, to gather all the
278 scientific evidence published since the previous evaluations. The risk to bees varied
279 depending on the crop and exposure route, but “for all the outdoor uses, there was at least one
280 aspect of the assessment indicating a high risk.”

281 On April 27, 2018, the European Commission decided to impose a ban on three of the six
282 neonicotinoids that are allowed in Europe, after managing to achieve the necessary qualified
283 majority among EU member states. All outdoor uses of three active substances use in plant
284 protection products (Bayer’s imidacloprid and clothianidin, and Syngenta’s thiamethoxam)
285 are be banned, and use is only permitted in permanent greenhouses [50].

286 This does not at all solve the problem of widespread pollution with this class of persistent
287 chemicals in Europe because:

288 - the use of these 3 chemicals as plant protection products in greenhouses continues and
289 the also large scale use of these three chemicals as biocide in cattle breeding, treatment of
290 fleas and flies in pets and treatment of transport vehicles (containers, ships, trucks, cattle-
291 trucks, etc.) continues to pollute surface waters and soils from where the toxic substances will
292 continue to translocate to pollen and nectar of wild plants.

293 - after the 2013 and 2018 bans, for many applications there has been be a shift to the 3
294 other neonicotinoids that are still allowed in Europe, thiacloprid, acetamiprid and sulfoxaflor.

295 Based on a conclusion by EFSA that thiacloprid is not safe for human health [51], on 22
296 October 2019, the EU decided not the renew the authorization of thiacloprid, meaning that
297 after April 2020 thiacloprid is no longer allowed for outdoor use in agriculture.

298 Critical discourse analysis and institutional analysis have been used in [52] to interpret the
299 controversy. The case study revealed the existence of two ‘discourse coalitions’:

300 (1) One, represented by Bayer, AFSSA and partially the Ministry, make reference, in their
301 public discourses, to all honeybee losses (everywhere in France, in all seasons). They do not
302 particularly focus on sunflower and maize areas, or on the specific signs observed by
303 beekeepers in these areas. However, they make reference to other potentially causal factors in
304 arguing for a non-causal relationship between imidacloprid and honeybees.

305 (2) The second, represented by beekeepers and public scientists, affirm the determinant role
306 of imidacloprid in honeybee losses found in sunflower and maize areas, all stating that many
307 causes, among which diseases must require particular attention, can lead to honeybee losses
308 all over France. Some beekeepers also pointed to the sublethal action of imidacloprid and to
309 its possible synergic effects with diseases.

310 Specific to the case, it identified the following sources of controversy:

- 311 • Lack of shared definition and quantification of the signs
- 312 • Lack of specialist knowledge on honeybees
- 313 • Patterns of strategic discursive practices: part of the debate on ‘multi-causality versus
314 imidacloprid was due to confusion, to strategic discursive practices and to passionate
315 attitudes regarding persons from the ‘opposite camp’. The experts themselves are trapped in
316 the socio-political position associated with an argument and stop thinking critically about its
317 plausibility.

318

319 Based on this analysis [52] six new knowledge quality criteria are proposed that can assist in
320 assessing the information communicated in an argumentative public process:

321

- 322 1. reliability of the information – it must be based on all available scientific knowledge;
- 323 2. robustness of the information – it must take into account criticism;
- 324 3. use of the information produced by other stakeholders;
- 325 4. relevancy of the arguments for issue under debate;
- 326 5. logical coherence of the discourse;
- 327 6. legitimacy of the information source.

328

329 Further, our findings deepen the understanding of the relationships between the social,
330 economic, and institutional stakes of the actors involved in the debate and their strategies of
331 ‘creating uncertainty’ [53].

332

333 [Third Lens, sensitivity auditing](#)

334 [The lens](#)

335 Sensitivity auditing (not to be confused with sensitivity analysis [54]) addresses models and
336 indicators when used at the science-policy interface. It includes and extends global
337 uncertainty and sensitivity analyses and checks for rhetoric or ritual use of mathematical
338 modelling. Sensitivity auditing is especially suited to deconstruct dubious quantifications,
339 reframe contested issues and possibly defuse controversies. Given the omnipresence of
340 quantification in environmental and sustainability assessment, this lens plays the role of fact
341 checking, looking specifically at the quality (both normative and technical) of numbers and
342 their production. Sensitivity auditing, as distinct from uncertainty quantification and
343 sensitivity analysis, is extensively described and commented both in the European
344 Commission guidelines for impact assessment[55] and in a more recent report of the science
345 academies on science for policy (SAPEA [11]).

346

347 **Uncertainty quantification** involves a propagation of the uncertainties of the input factors
348 and assumptions throughout the model, all the way up to the model-based inference. Scholars
349 from various disciplines [56], [24] have noted that a modeller might resort to ‘massaging’,
350 e.g. arbitrarily reducing or inflating, the uncertainty depending upon whether one wishes to
351 reinforce or to invalidate a model-based assessment.

352 A global quantitative **sensitivity analysis** [54] explores systematically the space of the input
353 factors [57] in order to ascertain which input factor or assumption drives the uncertainty, and
354 which is instead uninfluential.

355 Scientific evidence presented in support to policy is likely to be conflictual and disputed. In
356 upholding their peculiar knowledge claims, all sides in disputes may be guilty of
357 inappropriate generalizations, hidden value judgements and misrepresentation of the other
358 parties' arguments. In these situations, a model-based assessment may be vulnerable to the
359 choice of the model itself, to the institutional or industrial setting where the model was
360 developed, and to the framing of the study. This is addressed by **sensitivity auditing's** seven
361 points checklist [58]:

- 362 • **Rule 1:** 'Check against rhetorical use of mathematical modelling'; are results being
363 over-interpreted? Is the model being used ritually or rhetorically?
- 364 • **Rule 2:** 'Adopt an "assumption hunting" attitude'; this would focus on unearthing
365 possibly implicit assumptions.
- 366 • **Rule 3:** 'Detect pseudo-science'; this asks whether uncertainty has been downplayed,
367 as discussed above, in order to present results in a more favourable light.
- 368 • **Rule 4:** 'Find sensitive assumptions before these find you'; this is a reminder that
369 before publishing results the analysis of sensitivity should be done and made
370 accessible to researchers.
- 371 • **Rule 5:** 'Aim for transparency'. This rule echoes present debates on open data, and of
372 the need for a third party to be able to replicate a given analysis.
- 373 • **Rule 6:** 'Do the right sums'; the analysis should not solve the wrong problem – doing
374 the right sums is more important than doing the sums right. This rule is about asking
375 whether the given quantification is not neglecting important alternative ways to frame
376 a given example.
- 377 • **Rule 7:** 'Focus the analysis on the key question answered by the model, exploring
378 holistically the entire space of the assumptions'. An important implication of this rule
379 is that a model cannot be audited for sensitivity once and for all, but needs to be re-
380 audited in the context of each specific application of the model.

381 Recent applications of these methodologies were in the field of models for the costing of
382 climate change [59], the ecological footprint [60], GMO [61], the OECD-PISA studies [62],
383 epidemiology [63], and the food security case described here [21]. An extension of rule 6
384 about how to characterize and evaluate the framing of an issue is quantitative storytelling
385 [64][65]. Sensitivity auditing is part of an ongoing reflection on ethics of quantification
386 [66][67].

387

388 [The lens in action: Feeding the planet in 2050](#)

389 A study [68] has suggested that improving in agricultural techniques and adopting better
390 dietary styles will lead to producing more food on less land, as to feed, in 2050, ten billion
391 people. The scenario proposed in the study frames the world as suffering from obesity in the
392 developed countries and hunger in developing countries because of the inappropriateness of
393 the global food production system. The proposed solutions aim at better diets and the
394 contextual reduction of common diseases such as obesity and diabetes. This is achieved
395 thanks to the world agriculture reducing the production of cereals, starches, oils, fats, and
396 sugars in favour of that of fruit and vegetables.

397 The policy mix advocated to meet these goals includes consumer education, better food
398 literacy and cooking skills, taxing unhealthy food, limiting the use of antibiotics, mitigating
399 greenhouse gas emission in agriculture, reducing the US corn subsidy, and realizing better
400 storage facilities in developing countries. Note that all measures but the last are to be
401 implemented in developed countries. Sensitivity auditing notes instead [21]:

- 402 • The study proposes 9% reduction in land use, and 1% yearly improvement in
403 production between now and 2050, when population is assumed at 10 billion.
404 Doing the computations, it results that the same amount of food per capita is
405 produced in 2050 as today. Hence the future scenario does not generate more food
406 per person on average.
- 407 • Assuming that agriculture can grow on average by 1% between now and 2050
408 implying neglecting the existing and projected stress on soils.
- 409 • Will people desire to adopt a less cereal-and-meat-based diet? In 2050 there will
410 be a higher share of adults given the forecasted reduction in fertility, and adults
411 need more calories than children. Additionally, existing literature points to an
412 increasing consumption of meat in developing countries.

413 • As per the role of education, the study [13] presents smoking as an example of
414 how better policies and education may lead to better habits. In fact, while smoking
415 decreases in developed countries it increases in many developing ones.
416 Developing countries have weaker regulatory systems, less capable to counteract
417 food lobbies, so that the desired policies are predicated on a global improvement
418 of governance.

419 An alternative framing of the issue could consider that asymmetries in the political power of
420 trade patterns are at the root of the issue of diet quality in several areas of the world, a
421 phenomenon that has been recently named ‘caloric unequal exchange’. Although the export
422 from Latin America and the Caribbean to the rest of the world are more expensive than those
423 imported, the ratio of the two is decreasing with time, with the global south subsidizing the
424 diet of the global north.

425 Hence the proposed scenario applies a developed world perspective, substituting a political
426 problem - power asymmetry, with a technical one - a mismatch between what the world
427 needs for everyone to enjoy a nutritious diet and what the world is actually producing.

428 Fourth lens, Bioeconomics

429 The lens

430 Bio-economics was suggested by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen [69] as a necessary
431 complement to neo-classical economics in order to avoid the dangerous hypo-cognition
432 determined by its simplistic framing of the issue of sustainability. Bioeconomics analyses in
433 a transdisciplinary way the interaction of the socio-economic process with the ecological
434 processes in which the society is embedded describing the metabolic pattern of socio-
435 ecological systems across different levels and dimensions. In particular, the accounting
436 method of Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism
437 (MuSIASEM) identifies and characterizes the factors determining the “feasibility” (e.g.
438 existence of external biophysical constraints when looking at the compatibility of processes
439 taking place in the technosphere with processes taking place in the biosphere), “viability”
440 (e.g. existence of internal biophysical and economic constraints affecting processes inside
441 the technosphere) and “desirability” (e.g. stakeholders’ norms and world views determining
442 the stability of institutional settings) of the metabolic pattern. In the context of the present
443 integrated set this particular lens provides an additional layer of fact checking (also here both
444 technical and normative) based on the discipline of bioeconomics. It can unencumber the

445 public discourse from fantastic scenarios which simply ‘don’t compute’ in light of
446 bioeconomic analysis.

447 [The lens in action: A biophysical analysis of the circular economy](#)

448 Neo-classical economics portrays the economic process as a self-sustaining merry-go-round
449 between production and consumption of goods and services, in which the crucial role of the
450 environment in providing primary inputs and recycling wastes is simply not considered [70].
451 Therefore, we can say that the idea of ‘circular economy’ is a direct legacy of a systemic
452 adoption of economic narratives when framing the sustainability predicament. Two
453 considerations based on biophysical analysis can be used to show the fundamental challenges
454 that the concept of circular economy entails when ecological constraints are taken into
455 account and confronted with an economic paradigm advocating for infinite growth.

456 ***1. In empirical terms – the industrial revolution has been “the big linearization”***

457 *Food Security* - Since 1970 the size of human population has doubled whereas the production
458 of food has more than doubled (because of the double conversion to produce animal
459 products). The need of continuously boosting food production for a growing population
460 (demographic pressure entails less land per capita) using less farmers in the work force (the
461 bio-economic pressure associated with massive urbanization) has implied the abandonment
462 of traditional and ecological friendly methods of agricultural production (where nutrients
463 were naturally re-circulated). The progressive move to the paradigm of industrial agriculture
464 implies that nutrients and other inputs are based on massive injection of fossil energy [71].
465 The pace and density of natural deposition of nitrogen in the soil would not make it possible
466 to achieve average yields of 7-10 tonnes of grain per hectare – what is achieved by modern
467 agriculture in developed countries. Even more important is the constraint on the limited size
468 of the work force in agriculture in developed countries. To achieve a productivity of labor in
469 the order of thousand kg of grain/hour modern agriculture is based on high external input
470 mechanized monocultures.

471

472 *Energy Security* - The same linearization of flows took place in relation to energy security
473 when moving from biomass to fossil energy. The supply of energy to modern society is
474 obtained by linear flows coming from stocks of fossil energy providing a density and a pace
475 of energy flows which is orders of magnitude higher than the one obtainable when using
476 biomass produced by closing nutrient cycles [72]. The industrial revolution implied a
477 dramatic switch from an exploitation of renewable energy sources – flows of biomass and

478 other sources provided by natural processes – to non-renewable energy sources – fossil
479 reserves accumulated by natural processes for millions of years.

480

481 When considering biophysical processes adopted by modern societies to guarantee food and
482 energy security we can conclude that the major boost in productivity of both land and labor
483 have been obtained because of a clear linearization of flows. Relying on nature to “close the
484 loop” will imply a major reduction in the productivity of production factors (a green
485 degrowth).

486

487 **2. *In theoretical terms - the elephant in the room: the entropic nature of the economic***
488 ***process***

489 *What is circulated in the economy of developed countries?* – A paper entitled “how circular is
490 the global economy” published by Haas et al. [73] provides clear evidence that both the
491 economy of the world and that of developed economies (they use the assessment of the
492 European Union as example) is not circular. The analysis of the material flows in Europe, for
493 the year 2005 shows that 52% of the material input (without considering water) is composed
494 of either food or energy inputs: these are two flows that by default are degraded in an
495 irreversible way and that therefore cannot be recycled. Another 45% of the material input is
496 composed of construction materials that are incorporated in the societal fund elements in the
497 form of buildings and infrastructures. This leaves a 3% of material goods that could be
498 recycled. Recycling rates of these materials differ substantially among materials and
499 countries [74], but the level of recirculation of the materials in consumable and durable
500 products is generally low – the average over the mix is well below 40% [75].

501

502 *The entropic nature of the economy* - However, it should be noted that there is an elephant in
503 the room missed by the analysis of material flows given above: the key role of water in
504 making the metabolic pattern of modern economies possible. Water is the engine used by
505 Gaia to keep life on our planet and it is essential in preserving the health of ecosystems. The
506 contribution of the water cycle, totally outside of human control, both in energy and matter
507 terms, is orders of magnitude larger than the material and energy flows metabolized by
508 society [76]. Using a very conservative estimate of 300 tonnes of water evapotranspired
509 per tonne of biomass produced and consumed by society the water used by natural processes
510 to produce human food is more than 100 times larger than the solid material flow

511 metabolized by society. When considering also this element we can conclude that
512 Georgescu-Roegen was right, the economy is an entropic process which is based on the
513 availability of primary sources and primary sinks provided “free-of charge” by nature.
514 Natural processes are free, but unfortunately, they have a pace and a density that do not
515 match the required productivity of the production factors expected in developed economies.

516
517

518 Fifth lens, Ethics of science for governance

519 The lens

520 This lens tackles the integration of ethical concern in the way science is produced and
521 deployed in support to a given policy into the assessments of progress in science and
522 technology towards a sustainable future. Ethical concerns may pertain the integrity of the
523 science, the ethical conduct of research experiments, and the social responsibility in science
524 and technology - now addressed under the term Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).
525 All of these concerns refer to underlying values and basic ethical issues. The use of
526 methodologies such as ethical matrices, value mapping and value atlas can help to ensure that
527 both fact-based and value-based elements of a study can be properly contextualised. The
528 purpose of this lens in the economy of the present work is – again – a quality check of the
529 proposed narratives, to debunk those which are evidently and fatally based of the normative
530 and cultural frames of the observer and not of the observed. It seeks alignment with social
531 values and contributes, thus, to trust among the knowledge producers and knowledge-users.

532

533 The lens in action: The variety of values of seafood production and value chains

534 Seafood is globally the most traded commodity, and it is securing an ever-increasing market
535 share in industrialised countries. Because of its importance, coupled to both highly positive
536 potentials (food security: more high quality healthy, safe food etc.) and to negative scenarios
537 (depleting the ocean resources, polluting coastal zones, decreasing quality of food, fish
538 diseases, etc.), seafood is on everybody’s agenda. The prospect of a blue (sustainable
539 maritime) economy seems like one of the few promising development paths which can
540 capture the minds of people, very much like the Klondike of the past. Yet, closer inspection
541 reveals some major challenges.

542 First of all, ecology: expanding the production of food from the oceans implies major
543 interventions and changes in our ecosystems. This seems also relevant for future aquaculture

544 developments. Given that many of our marine ecosystems in many parts of the world are
545 highly vulnerable already, and given far-reaching protection goals of these ecosystems,
546 managing significantly increased seafood productions without polluting effects or other
547 potential harms (fish diseases, diminishing stocks, and so on) appears a delicate task. All such
548 interventions will generate societal value conflicts and intense political debate.

549 Secondly, socio-cultural challenge: growth also implies huge societal efforts and new
550 infrastructures to integrate the increased novel food production into ordinary market
551 mechanisms, as seafood is to a large part traded in long value chains across the globe. Local
552 market supply is still the rule in developing poor countries, but in industrialised countries, as
553 e.g. Europe, globally traded seafood dominates the market. What can be seen so far is that
554 ethical concerns seem to gain more ground among consumers and should perhaps be included
555 in our policies [77].

556 Thirdly, divided science: in regard to fisheries we see that managing fish stocks in our
557 oceans seems a permanent unfinished business, with some scientific assessments pointing in
558 one direction and political multi-national decision-making on quota going in another
559 direction, always with higher allowances. Precaution and short-term economic gains seem at
560 cross-purposes to the detriment of the fish stocks.

561 The situation concerning seafood as combining both fisheries and aquaculture shows all the
562 typical signs of post-normality (Lens 1): facts are uncertain, values disputed, decisions urgent
563 and decision stakes are high. Even the most basic depictions of the state-of-the art, of the
564 problems, and of the option space are so deeply value-infected that they only partially
565 overlap. Controversy surrounds the available catch data due to the importance of illegal or
566 unreported activities [78] to the effect that global assessments differ.

567 Stock assessments (be they global or local) are beset with inherent uncertainties, and the very
568 same methods used to arrive at such assessments vary significantly.

569 Similar conflicts plague the aquaculture community and marine scientists. What is the
570 environmental and resource impact of current aquaculture? Why is there widespread
571 consumer scepticism against aquaculture products? How do we assess the potential of future
572 aquaculture development, be it on land-based or integrated multi-trophic systems? Here we
573 find the same or similar value-infectedness as with the fisheries. For some scientists, the
574 ecological accounting of aquaculture bespeaks extensive small-scale production units,
575 regulated by strict certification schemes and legal regimes. For others, intensive large-scale

576 production is an obvious need in view of the need to feed an increasing global population,
577 and to meet expectations of the global markets.

578 To complicate an already complex picture the possible introduction of genetically modified
579 production fish in aquaculture needs to be considered [79], with its ethical implications.

580 As the value chain of seafood is to a very large extent long and global, knowledge about
581 similarities and differences in the values and ethical principles of the involved cultures cannot
582 be excluded. Ongoing research in practical ethics [80] involves the creation of value atlas
583 [81], aimed at gathering the most significant data, surveys and studies on attitudes and values
584 related to an important development path of economy, science and technology. Empirical
585 research to this end may utilise value-mapping as exemplified in a study of aquaculture in
586 Asia [82]. Ethical considerations are also addressed via ethical matrices [83][84] where
587 chosen ethical principles are specified in regard to the interests of different stakeholders.

588 Assume the aim is to assess the ethical aspects of a certain genetic modification of a fish
589 species for food production in a region. Following the ethical matrix approach, the first task
590 would be to identify the relevant stakeholders, e.g. small-scale producers and consumers.
591 Another requirement would be to identify potentially affected organisms and their
592 components of the environment, for example fish and biota. A proper set of ethical principles
593 needs then to be established: justice/fairness, dignity/autonomy, the obligation to do no harm
594 and the goal of doing good, for example. Once a common understanding of these principles is
595 ensured, it is important that the principles are specified for each interest perspective. The
596 result is an ethical matrix that represents the starting point of the ethical assessment, here
597 from [85].

598 *Table 1*

| <i>Ethical matrix for gm-fish:</i> | Do avoid doing any harm | Do try to do some good | Dignity / autonomy | Justice / fairness |
|---|---|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Small producers | Dependencies on nature and corporations | Adequate income and work security | Freedom to adopt or not to adopt | Fair treatment in trade |
| Consumers | Safe food | Nutritional quality Food security | Respect for consumer choice (labelling) | General affordability of food product |

| | | | | |
|--------------|---|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Treated fish | Proper animal welfare | Improved disease resistance | Behavioural freedom | Respect for natural capacities (telos) |
| Biota | Pollution and strain on natural resources | Increasing sustainability Improved resilience | Maintenance of biodiversity | No additional strain on regional natural resources |

599

600 This test case shows how facts and values are deeply intertwined when discussing seafood
601 production and consumption. The topic of seafood (as assumedly the topic of food in general)
602 should be connected to deep seated value issues, and these values should be made explicit.
603 This applies equally to the value-infectedness of most of the scientific expertise dealing with
604 this topic. Presentations of relatively complex issues like the state of the fish stocks in the
605 oceans or the prospects of aquaculture developments should at the outset be designed to
606 present a range of different viewpoints and data entries (Value Atlas). One of the dangers is
607 the fixation of ethical assessments to a single tool of practical ethics (e.g. the ethical matrix),
608 in the belief that all relevant aspects of the complex issue have indeed been captured. We
609 surmise that this happened, for instance, in the field of medical ethics, where one analytic
610 tool gained prominence over all others [86]. Ethical issues – their normative nature
611 notwithstanding - are always highly contextual and to a certain extent culture-dependent, at
612 least in terms of social acceptance. Openness to different value-landscapes and plurality in
613 the ethical toolbox are a pre-requisite for avoiding that in-built bias of the analyst
614 significantly skews the assessment. Finally, conflicted topics regarding seafood (or similar
615 topics) should be presented with entries that can guide the user to further ethical reflection
616 and include as much relevant data and knowledge as possible.

617

618 Sixth lens, non-Ricardian economics

619 The lens

620 While non-Ricardian economics may sound as a term of the craft, it is gaining traction in the
621 context of the present climate of yet timid revision of economic theory [87]. It denotes the
622 economic theories which refute Ricardo's theorem of comparative advantage and decries its
623 momentous implications in the present mostly neoliberal institutional arrangements, as
624 discussed below. A relevant work in this context is "*How rich countries got rich and why*

625 *poor countries stay poor*” [88]. First published in 2007, it is now translated into more than
 626 twenty languages, confirming that the transition is within our Zeitgeist just alluded to.

627 Even environmental studies need to rely on an economic paradigm, implicitly or explicitly.
 628 What would happen if the prevailing paradigms were flawed? We argue that today’s
 629 mainstream economic theory is flawed for a number of reasons, and this section lists some of
 630 them [88]. During the Enlightenment the establishment of taxonomies – as in the case of
 631 Linnaeus – created order. Similarly, in economics, there were theories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
 632 trade for a country [89]. A key feature of today’s economic theory is the lack of any
 633 taxonomy. A simple taxonomy of three different types of economic activities would explain
 634 the old idea of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trade, and it will also assist us in distinguishing where
 635 technology optimism is appropriate and where technology pessimism seems most
 636 appropriate:

- 637 1. Activities subject to *diminishing returns to scale*, i.e. when one factor of production is
 638 limited by nature (agriculture, mining, fisheries). This makes economics into a
 639 ‘dismal’ science because increasing production yields increasingly lower production.
 640 These activities are subject to perfect competition, e.g. increased productivity tends to
 641 lower prices to the consumer rather than increase profits and wages to the producers.
- 642 2. Activities subject to *constant returns to scale*. Traditional service sector, professions
 643 like barbers and house painters.
- 644 3. Activities subject to *increasing returns to scale*. Here each new unit of production
 645 lowers the costs of production, allowing for imperfect competition by creating high
 646 barriers to entry into the industry.

647 Paradoxically, if one looks at the history of economics, the present orthodoxy – which
 648 neglects these fundamental distinctions, represents a minority view in a secular perspective of
 649 human development [90][91] where nations’ strategy has been to manufacture/industrialize
 650 first, and open to the market later. Exporting raw materials in order to import manufactured
 651 goods was for centuries seen as ‘bad trade’.

652 Thus, this lens argues that sustainability is hampered by the prevailing, neoclassical, free-
 653 trade-based paradigm which de facto blocks developing countries’ path to development based
 654 on manufacture of increasing returns goods and locks them into activities exploiting nature
 655 under diminishing returns.

656 The distinction between increasing and diminishing returns is crucial in understanding the
657 difference – in energy production, between unsustainable extraction e.g. of oil and coal
658 versus the sustainable manufacturing of harvesting energy from wind and sun.

659 The quality checks offered by this lens are crucial – no transition or development is possible
660 based on a flawed economic theory.

661

662 The lens in action: Evaluating the Potential for Green Growth in a context of Technology
663 Optimism and Technology Pessimism

664 This test case investigates the consequences of adopting a different economic canon to look
665 at transitions.

666 The standard, neo-classical canon of economic development is instrumental in maintaining
667 radical differences between the global North and the global South, a difference pursued by
668 the colonial powers against their colonies since the XIX century, and based on keeping them
669 de-industrialized [88][92]. In a world of perfect free trade, forbidden to develop their own
670 system of manufactures and innovation, developing countries are lectured on the need to
671 develop e.g. the right institutions - as if the right institutions could produce the successful
672 model of economic development. We refer to this presently popular approach – focusing on
673 the symptoms rather than on the causes of poverty – as *palliative economics* [88].

674 History teaches a different lesson, one where Novelty, Diversity, Scale, and Synergy and the
675 interaction between these factors produce wealth - in a system which allows countries to
676 dynamically pursue increasing returns activities which in turn demand the development of
677 appropriate institutions. Applied in the restricted context of the European Union, the standard
678 Ricardian canon is presently damaging economies of east European countries where signals
679 of re-feudalization are appearing as a result of the destruction of their manufacture [93].
680 More, the present situation which advantages the developed countries is unsustainable in the
681 long term - as the increasing number of failing states shows. From the early Italian city states
682 until the Marshall Plan it has been understood that wealth was a result of synergies between
683 increasing returns activities, i.e. industry and manufacture. The fact that the world's most
684 efficient farmers - in the EU and US - still need subsidies and protection testifies to this.

685 The direct application of these concepts to the energy futures [94] suggest adopting
686 renewables and cleantech, not just for emission reduction, but because these embody

687 technological change, manufacturing, learning curve effects, and are thus capable of
688 capturing increasing returns. In contrast, fossil fuels are a typical diminishing returns activity.

689 Putting renewable energies at the core of a country's industrial policy will drive down costs
690 as the country moves along the learning curve. As costs decline, so the market expands and
691 even more specialized activities can be developed. These in turn enhance productivity and
692 lead to further market expansion, further fall in costs, and further specialization within a well-
693 tested capitalist system of "circular and cumulative causation".

694 We argue that the energy choices currently being made by China and India appear to conform
695 to this reading, whereby China might be the first country to lead the path to an expansion of
696 the market for renewables and reduction of the costs made possible by the increasing returns.
697 With renewable power energy can be harvested, which at present is only practiced in
698 hydropower, while with fossil fuels it needs to be extracted under diminishing returns. This
699 path to transition based on an industrial policy focusing on renewables appears much more
700 promising and better supported by evidence than generic calls for "more innovation" or for
701 taxes on carbon-intensive activities. As for the past, a period of protection will be needed to
702 let these "infant industries" gain speed. At present, the case for renewables is opposed by
703 vested interest of the fossil fuel sector [95] as well as by the so called "neutral" economists
704 who insist that markets should be allowed to function "free of interference". Yet the example
705 of China show that state support can be in the long term successful, repeating for energy what
706 was the development trajectory followed by all developed countries in manufacturing
707 [92][88][93].

708

709 The lenses together

710 To show where integrating the lenses leads, an overview (Table 2) describes the role and
711 expected contribution of each lens to the enhancement of key attributes of integrated
712 assessments: saliency, legitimacy and credibility.

713 *Table 2 Role of each of the lenses in enhancing integrated assessments. The focus is on main attributes according to EEA's*
714 *perspective: saliency, legitimacy and credibility [5]*

715 [Table 2 here]

716

717 Additionally, to show an example of all lenses in action, we go back to the example of food
718 security discussed in the third lens. In this test case [21] we used sensitivity auditing to reach
719 the conclusions that the numbers produced in the context of a research on food security [68]
720 didn't stand, and that the overall narrative of this style of problem solving – which one can
721 name as techno-optimist, replaced a political problem – global inequality, with a technical
722 problem – the mix of agricultural goods produced. We now revisit the same case using all
723 lenses.

- 724 • The global system of trade bears a fundamental responsibility for diet quality in
725 several areas of the world, a phenomenon that has been recently named caloric
726 unequal exchange [96], with the global south subsidizing the diet of the global north.
727 Our economic non-Ricardian lens suggests that poor countries are kept poor by the
728 interdiction to develop a manufacturing sector. For this lens even the same
729 millennium development goals are problematic, as they represent an attempt to cure
730 the symptoms – i.e. poverty, rather than its cause, for which international institutions
731 such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund bear important
732 responsibilities. A critique of the millennium development goals – as done in [88],
733 implies a rather dramatic change of economic zeitgeist which we as author hesitate to
734 predict: are we close to a moment similar to 1848, i.e. a turn away from abstract
735 economic theories toward more relevant ones [97]? History will tell. The level of
736 resistance associated to this type of ideological transition calls for the expertise of our
737 controversy lens.
- 738 • The assumption that what works in developed countries, in terms e.g. of educational
739 policies for a transition to a different diet [21], will also work in developing countries
740 resembles the already discussed case of implanting common law in Iraq. Here the
741 ethical lens would warn us that something is seriously wrong.
- 742 • Some of the numbers seen in food security do not resist deconstruction [21], as shown
743 by the sensitivity auditing analysis.
- 744 • The role of genetically modified technology to achieve a new regime of food
745 production can be seen as an imprudent use of technology, while the framing of the
746 GMO debate in terms of alimentary safety has been exposed as incomplete, forgetful
747 of the political debate in society on the desirability of the new technologies and on the
748 configuration of power the technology promotes [98]. Bioeconomics and Post normal

749 science offer some clarity here. For example, a simple fact checking on biophysical
 750 quantities (e.g. yields per hectare) shows that the promise of higher yields associated
 751 with the adoption of GMO crops is simply not true [99]. It is indicative that popular
 752 resistance to GM food has focused more on the ethical issues than on the risk issues
 753 [100][101]. The Precautionary Principle has appeal because of its ethical
 754 underpinnings [102][103]. Being explicit about this and addressing the ethical
 755 challenges should be the norm rather than the exception [84], side-lined to the social
 756 sciences and philosophy.

- 757 • The idea of precision or intensive agriculture can be seen as an example of
- 758 linearization of the complexities of the top-soil system. Even here PNS' appeal to
- 759 prudent technology and bioeconomics' careful accounting of what is feasible come to
- 760 the fore.

761 While reasons of space prevent us from reproducing this 'all lenses' approach to all
 762 narratives discussed here, we hope that the gist of the school has been given.

763 Conclusions:

764 The ideas that something is lacking in existing stories about sustainability and transitions is a
 765 common topos. To make just two examples among many, for Sheila Jasanoff [15] existing
 766 transition discourses gloss over the uncertain relationships between prosperity and
 767 sustainability and do not address the elementary principle of social justice on how the burden
 768 should be shared. For Jeremy Lent [14] our collective action to enact transitions to a more
 769 sustainable future is hampered by the lingering of unhelpful metaphors, mainly that of 'man
 770 as master and possessor of nature', and about 'nature as a machine'; thus, if nature is a
 771 machine, I can fix it by geoengineering its climate, manipulating the genes of its species, and
 772 solve with science and technology the problems which science and technology have created.

773 We continue in this tradition of critique, with a somewhat more specific question:

774 **1) To what extent does the method, or the discipline, influence the prescription of**
 775 **the analysis?** As stated in the title, the technique is never neutral. Our present is
 776 populated with several stories – some of which touched in this article, whose
 777 existence is permitted by the chosen methodological and disciplinary configuration.
 778 Challenging this configuration, e.g. replacing neoclassic economics with
 779 bioeconomics and non-Ricardian economics; a neo-positivistic vision of the role of
 780 science and technology with a post normal one; audacious quantifications with

781 responsible ones; and looking at the present with its conflicts as the place where
 782 different values are plausible and legitimate, may result in novel insights and
 783 narratives. We have zoomed in on a set of approaches or tools which we call lenses,
 784 with the idea that - applying these together, a richer picture will emerge and thus
 785 enlarge the space of the possible solutions. **Wearing those lenses both implies and**
 786 **produces important changes of perspective.**

787 If progress cannot be achieved by developing nations in a regime of perfect trade,
 788 then what has to be changed is our global governance. If the linearized idea of nature
 789 underpinning many existing risk and cost benefit analyses is replaced by the concept
 790 of nature as a system of systems, as suggested by relational biology [104] and
 791 bioeconomics, then many existing ‘proofs’ of feasibility of new technologies need to
 792 be reconsidered. Looking through the existing frames and metaphors in search of
 793 forgotten or ignored knowledges may open the space to other possible solutions, and
 794 unmask the improper translation of a political problem into a technical one [23].
 795 Insisting on notions of ‘consensus’ in science for policy may imply a
 796 misrepresentation or a banalization of the opinion of dissenters, which may lead to
 797 further radicalization, while at the same time neglecting power games and
 798 relationships when high interests are at stake. Ignoring ethical and cultural
 799 specificities of different publics in the global arena may lead to blunders similar to the
 800 US attempt to transplant the US judiciary system into Iraq after the end of hostilities
 801 [105], and so on.

802 2) **How to tackle uncertainties and ensure quality in integrated assessment for**
 803 **sustainability?** We suggest that the lenses provide a convincing intellectual
 804 framework for this purpose. One might look at a specific sustainability or transition
 805 policy wearing the lenses and running through a checklist as:

- 806 - Is the framing of the problem incomplete? Does the framing include its political (as
 807 opposed to technical) dimensions, or was the technique, and its numbers, used to
 808 obfuscate and distract? (All lenses)
- 809 - How robust is the process adopted to produce quantified information? Whose
 810 evidence counts? Have all affected actors been identified? Who are the
 811 winners/losers? Who are the excluded? (PNS, sensitivity auditing)

- 812 - Does the transition take into consideration the systemic property of the problem?
813 (Bioeconomics)
- 814 - Is the transition compatible with the ethos and the culture of the involved publics?
815 Are there conflicts in the value-landscapes of these cultures? Which roots do these
816 have? (Ethics)
- 817 - Are prudent, controllable technologies employed? (PNS)

818

819 The reader will have noticed that this approach has many elements of a *via negativa*, like
820 when in theology we renounce defining God but describe what God is not. This approach is
821 particularly apt to deconstruct ineffectual or rhetorical narratives. This is not an accident. As
822 argued by Nassim Taleb [106] our societies are affected by a ‘positive’ bias; they demand
823 from the experts what needs to be done – and nobody gets elected for admitting that a dense
824 web of trade-offs and conflicting interests makes any political choice of a certain importance
825 a difficult affair. Yet, we argue that ‘what to avoid’ is perhaps more important than ‘what to
826 do’. Abandoning unfruitful paths makes more resources available for plausible ones. As
827 noted by the same Taleb, one way of winning is by not losing.

828

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838

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| Lens | Role | Salience <u>Definition:</u> (or relevance) is intended to reflect the ability of an assessment to address the particular concerns of a user. An assessment is salient to a user if that user is aware of the assessment, and if that user deems that assessment relevant to current policy or behavioural decisions | Legitimacy <u>Definition:</u> is a measure of the political acceptability or perceived fairness of an assessment to a user. A legitimate assessment process is one which has been conducted in a manner that allows users to be satisfied that their interests have been taken into account, and that the process has been a fair one | Credibility <u>Definition:</u> reflects the scientific and technical believability of the assessment to a defined user of that assessment, often in the scientific community. More credible assessments have done better at ensuring this sort of technical adequacy. |
|-----------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Post-Normal Science | A set of practical insights in science for policy, assisting scientists, stakeholders in working together when facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent. Quality is assessed with extended peer community, constituted by all those with a stake of interest in the relevant issue | Broad participation through extended peer communities reveals multiple framings and concerns to be included in the integrated assessment | The inclusion of multiple viewpoints (e.g. precautionary concerns) and engagement in extended-peer communities composed by experts, affected or interest citizens, journalists or whistle blowers, ensures more legitimacy compared to a technocratic approach | Credibility is increased by adopting PNS-related knowledge quality assurance tools and processes e.g. NUSAP, checklists |
| Controversy studies | An approach to analyse openly and systematically, scientific dissent and controversy, in contrast to 'consensus' approaches | Mapping of societal interests and conflicts co-shaping evidence production, use and communication can help in ensuring sound framing of integrated assessments, improving salience | Ensures that multiple sources of evidence and related controversy are included providing a more balanced representation and greater fairness | Credibility is increased as multiple sources of uncertainty and contrasting viewpoints are explicitly dealt with, leading to improved understanding of the quality of narratives |
| Sensitivity auditing | An approach that addresses models and indicators used at the science-policy interface, which builds on uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, checks against rhetoric use of modelling and deconstructs dubious quantifications | Ensures relevance of the proposed quantification | Allows to deconstruct framings and imaginaries across the board, facilitating a more transparent and open dialogue | The scrutiny of the knowledge base underpinning an integrated assessment through this lens could greatly increase credibility by screening out dubious quantitative outcomes and shoddy methods. |

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|---|--|---|---|---|
| Bioeconomy | A necessary complement to neo-classical economics that analyses the interactions of societal socio-economic processes with ecological processes by focusing on metabolic patterns of socio-ecological systems across different levels and scales | By allowing non-equivalent quantitative representations across levels and scales it allows to identify “winners and losers” hidden in the original story-telling used to support the policy (fight hypocognition) | Allows to deconstruct framings and imaginaries across the options space (feasibility, viability, desirability), facilitating a more transparent and open dialogue | Ensures that the quantification of socio-economic and ecological processes are consistent with feasibility and viability constraints, exposing incompatible assumptions, thus ensuring credibility to the assessment |
| Ethics of science for governance | Approach tackling the integration of ethical concerns in science development and use at the policy interface. It targets the inclusion of each interest perspective through practical ethics (e.g. value atlas, ethical matrices) | Addresses multiple stakeholders' questions, viewpoints and framings and can contribute in identifying the right questions, thus increasing salience | Stakeholders' perspectives and values are explicitly accounted and discussed, increasing the legitimacy of the outcome | |
| Non-Ricardian economics | Economic theory that refutes Ricardo's theorem of comparative advantage and discusses implications in the present, neoliberal institutional arrangement, by embracing experience based economic theory - the continental historical schools of economics | It is based on economic theory which has proven relevant and salient through centuries of history of economic thought | It gives voice to other perspectives regarding economic development and power relations, generally not aligned with main international institutions. Likely to improve fairness | Inclusion of alternative framing through which to decompose some axioms regarding economic development |